

This isn't the first flouting of the doctrine. Napoleon III had a whole army operating in Maximilian's Mexico. But the flouting always ceased, in former decades.

What happens this time, after Moscow has dispatched an armada of ships bearing technicians and service troops, Communist-bloc artillery, and communications equipment, plus supplies for a foundering economy?

The Kremlinologists constantly remind us that Moscow seldom acts from a single motive. We have two explanations for the Soviet move. One is that Moscow cannot afford, in terms of world prestige, to see its Cuban ally collapse in economic chaos. This would be no advertisement for communism.

Ergo, Moscow must sail to the rescue, and with sufficient military equipment to make Senor Castro invulnerable to internal revolt or small-scale amphibious attack.

The other explanation is that Moscow sees a way to make big trouble, close to home, for the United States; sees a chance to fortify a base for revolution that can reach out to all of Latin America; sees an opportunity to build a technological redoubt which can even track U.S. space experiments from Cape Canaveral.

Actually, the weighty probability is that both explanations will prove true. Having moved in to save the Cuban economy, Premier Khrushchev will exploit his leasehold to the full.

The question facing President Kennedy is what Moscow's boosted intervention will do to the "peace and safety" of the United States, which the original Monroe Doctrine was summoned up to protect.

Cuba as a creaking semi-Communist state was no great menace. Cuba as a Soviet-bloc state so heavily armed as to shift the military power balances in Latin America is a much bigger menace.

But if Cuba ever came to mean, to Premier Khrushchev or anyone else, that the United States, for fear of nuclear consequences, would hesitate to act when its "peace and safety" was threatened, then this would be the biggest peril of all.

This latter prospect was directly implicit in the reporter's question about the Monroe Doctrine.

[From the Seafarers Log, August 1962]

NATO GOES CUBAN, MOVES RED CARCO

The current mass shipment of food, arms, and technical equipment from the Soviet bloc to Cuba has been accomplished with the aid of some of the closest allies of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Shipowners in Britain, Norway, and Greece, among other countries, supplied most of the tonnage running to Havana and other Cuban ports. The "emergency" shipments were made necessary by Cuba's failure to provide enough of the necessities of life for her people, under the present Communist system. President Kennedy disclosed that the United States had discussed the Cuban shipping excursions by NATO country shipowners and said he would make every effort to have them curtailed.

The move by our allies to ship Communist supplies to Cuba is considered a direct contradiction of NATO policy, which is to stand firm against the Communist menace. Any weakening of this structure could have severe repercussions to the Western World.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, the continuing issue in Cuba, as Marguerite Higgins has so succinctly put it in her latest column "is not whether the Soviet-supplied missiles are offensive or defensive or whether Soviet officers are in Bermuda shorts rather than battle gear," but whether or not our policy of hesitation and restraint is not encouraging the Soviets to press harder.

The same sentiments, in effect, were expressed by Robert Frost on his return from the Soviet Union, when he said:

Khrushchev said he feared for U.S. modern liberals. He said we were too liberal to fight. I suppose he thought we'd stand there the next hundred years saying, "On the one hand; but on the other hand."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the perceptive article by Marguerite Higgins.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RUFFIANSHIP VERSUS RESTRAINT

(By Marguerite Higgins)

WASHINGTON.—The key issue in Cuba is not whether the Soviet-supplied missiles are offensive or defensive or whether Soviet officers are in Bermuda shorts rather than battle gear. The issue is whether American policies of so-called restraint tempt the Russians into putting on more pressure everywhere or whether U.S. restraint will be rewarded by Soviet restraint.

So far, President Kennedy, with, of course, the most honorable of motives, has most often taken the advice of those officials who counseled caution even at the price of letting the Russians get away with a slice here and a slice there of the U.S. world position in areas ranging from the Far East to central Europe to the Caribbean.

The President himself at a press conference stated part of the rationale for this attitude by indicating that America had to be cautious in Cuba because action against the Communist incursions there might result in Soviet counteractions in places like Berlin.

But what a tragedy if, for example, the initial slowness of American reaction should prove one day to be the factor that decided Khrushchev to authorize a new era of brinkmanship in Berlin by threatening to use the missiles newly emplaced along the Western air corridors to the city.

And with a new crisis boiling up, it seems important to bring to the surface what has been known for several months to insiders in Washington. This is that Americans of great stature, both in and out of Government, Democrats as well as Republicans, are now asking whether President Kennedy will preside over the decline of America as a great power.

Perhaps this seems unduly alarmist at a time when America is so psychologically attuned that headlines give greater attention to a "satisfactory conversation" between the American Secretary of the Interior and the Premier of the Soviet Union than to dispatches from Berlin saying that Russians have riddled an American military car with 40 machinegun bullets.

But nonetheless the question is being asked and soon, it can be predicted, will be put on the public record because the men involved know that the issues are too crucial to go undebated.

Indeed, some of President Kennedy's advisers most closely connected with the Berlin situation feel that in the coming months the United States is risking the most serious—and needless—confrontation with the Russians in Berlin because this country—not just in Europe but also in Cuba and elsewhere—has not faced up to the possibility that inaction vis-a-vis the Russians often runs greater risk than action.

As President Kennedy himself once remarked atmospherics have their uses, and the time to send sharp diplomatic protests to Moscow, to summon the Soviet Ambassador for stern confrontations, was at the beginning: That is, at the moment that the first Soviet ship of the recent armada (which

everybody knew was on the way) headed toward Cuba in July. The long silence on this score plus official attempts to play down the importance of it all was an invitation, the argument goes, for Moscow to believe that America was looking for a way to evade the challenge.

Moscow's reaction, of course, was very ungentlemanly. For instead of playing Washington's game, Moscow threw its challenge contemptuously in America's teeth by openly announcing to the world that it was sending military personnel and supplies to Cuba. There is a conviction in many responsible quarters that a straight and tough stand from the beginning would have greatly inhibited the Soviets—and still might. Nonetheless, it is a great mistake to rule out publicly whatever means might be necessary to curb Soviet intrusion, including a blockade and all that flows from that. How can promises of any sort of immunity help but embolden such an opponent?

For Robert Frost spoke true and well in Moscow when he described Premier Khrushchev as both a ruffian and a great man. Ruffianism has never been inconsistent with greatness, and the gentlemanly approach to international politics has never impressed the Bolsheviks.

Indeed, just 18 months ago, Premier Khrushchev created a stir in diplomatic circles by this remark on Cuba: "How am I to believe that Kennedy is serious about Berlin when he permitted the failure of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs? After all, Cuba is at America's own back door." This was, of course, a conversational probe and Khrushchev later indicated he did not subscribe entirely to his own thesis.

But here in Washington, advocates of a firm line earnestly warn that nothing less than the future of this country is at stake unless President Kennedy becomes convinced of this proposition: That the risk of counterpressure to Soviet thrusts is less than the risk of doing nothing because the greatest danger is that the next time Khrushchev says America is afraid he might really believe it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the middle of the front page of the Baltimore Sun of today, Monday, September 10, 1962, is an article entitled "Russian 'Horse Trade' Hinted—KEATING Says United States May Be Eyeing Cuba-Berlin Deal."

I should like to read excerpts from the article, as follows:

Senator KEATING said today "a horse trade" with Russia in Cuba and Berlin may be in the wind and branded it as a betrayal.

Further:

KEATING said reports circulating here "suggest that the Soviet Union may want to put Cuba and Berlin up on the auction block together for a diplomatic deal that would make some of our most hard-boiled negotiators blush."

And, again:

"In brass-tacks language," he said, "it would mean that Premier Khrushchev has told President Kennedy, 'you lay off on Berlin, we'll lay off on Cuba. But if you press us in Berlin, then we will put the screws on you in Cuba.'"

KEATING said "the United States may well be toying with some Soviet deal to link the two," adding:

"In some of his most recent utterances, the President has spoken of the two crises in the same breath and has in effect urged a 'wait and see' attitude."

KEATING said the United States must make clear to the people of Cuba and the people of Berlin and to people everywhere, "that no such deal is in the cards."

The article was sent out by the Associated Press, and I assume it was published in other newspapers throughout the country.

Mr. President, these references in the morning's press to statements, purportedly made by the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING], to which I have referred, and which use such words as "deal" or "a horse trade" between the United States and Russia over Berlin and Cuba must, I think, be discussed on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. President, the Senator from New York is a most responsible Member of this body whose understanding of foreign policy problems is deep and far reaching. He knows, for example, the difference between a fact and a rumor in the international situation. He knows that a sense of discernment between fact and rumor is essential if Senate discussion of foreign policy is to help to minimize rather than complicate the enormous burdens which the President bears in these matters. He knows, further, that President Kennedy did not create either the present Berlin situation or the present Cuban situation; that both were in existence long before he took office. He knows, too, I am sure, that the President is doing the best he can to deal with both issues in a way which safeguards the Nation and the interests of all of us. He knows, finally, that the President, as we all are, is most concerned that American lives not be expended unnecessarily through rashness or error in Cuba or Berlin.

Knowing how deep is the sense of responsibility of the Senator from New York, and his utter lack of partisanship where matters of great national concern are involved, I am somewhat at a loss to understand the news reports in this morning's press about a deal with Russia over Cuba and Berlin.

I am not quite sure what kind of a deal could be involved; but the Senator must know, since he speaks of it. It appears to be a most serious deal. And since the Senator from New York has referred to it, and the Senator is a most responsible man, I presume that the report has a serious foundation. It is always possible, of course, that the Senator was merely speculating on possible developments in a grave situation. The press may have misinterpreted his speculation. What was the Senator's fancy may have become fact by the peculiar chemistry in which the press sometimes indulges.

But I would most certainly like to know from the Senator from New York himself whether such was the case. If he was speculating, that would be an end to the matter.

But if the Senator from New York was doing more than speculating, if he knows of a deal involving a "horse trade" on Cuba and Berlin, that is a completely different matter. I am sure that the Senator from New York would agree that this is critical information of the greatest importance to the Nation. I am sure, too, that the Senator from New York would agree further that the President should also have access to this critical information and its

source, since the President, beyond talking or speculating, has the responsibility for decisions involving the very lives of Americans with respect both to Berlin and Cuba, as well as elsewhere. So I would ask the Senator from New York, whether or not he has specific information that a deal is being worked out, or is even being seriously contemplated, involving some kind of trade as between the situations in Berlin and Cuba and, if so, can he give the Senate the details and his source of information?

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Montana, our majority leader, whom we all deeply respect.

The news account to which he has referred, referred to a television program in Buffalo, in which I was very careful to say that the linking of Cuba and Berlin as a deal was a rumor which was prevalent in Washington; and I am sure the distinguished majority leader has not in these remarks for the first time heard the rumor that such a deal might be made.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this point will the Senator from New York yield?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I must admit in all honesty that I have never heard of a "deal" being made relative to a combination of matters affecting Cuba and Berlin. Of course I have heard the President and Members on this floor, the present speaker included, in discussing the Cuban situation, mention the fact that the responsibilities of the President were worldwide in nature; in addition to having to keep an eye on Cuba, he also had to watch conditions in Berlin, in southeast Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa, and in the Far East, in the region of Formosa, as well. There are other points which could be mentioned.

But I must admit—and I say this most sincerely—that I have never heard of any kind of "deal" which would affect the interrelationship of Berlin and Cuba, insofar as the policy of our President is concerned.

Mr. KEATING. Of course, Mr. President, I accept as a fact the statement of the majority leader.

If the word "deal" were not used, perhaps the majority leader has previously heard the rumor that these were all part and parcel of one proposal.

Perhaps it would clarify the situation to include following my remarks excerpts from such respected publications as U.S. News & World Report and the Northern Virginia Sun which include just such reports. I ask unanimous consent that these two articles be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the two articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From U.S. News & World Report]

War over Cuba, involving the United States with Russia, is moving closer, now that the Soviets have an advanced military base just off the coast of Florida.

President Kennedy, on September 7, asked Congress for authority to call up to 150,000 reservists. Main reason: The Russians' move into Cuba.

Soviet submarines, based on Cuba, are expected soon to lie athwart strategic lifelines of the United States to the Panama Canal, to the oil and raw materials of South America, ready to help Castro's Reds move to the mainland.

Missile-carrying Soviet submarines, based on Cuba, would threaten U.S. cities. Cuba, military leaders say, is an ideal base for high-accuracy missiles that can cover the heart of the United States.

In late 1959, long before the armed power of the Soviet Union moved into Cuba, Samuel Flagg Bemis, professor of diplomatic history and inter-American relations at Yale University, wrote an article for U.S. News & World Report. Professor Bemis, an outstanding authority in his field, warned that Communist power established in the Caribbean could "tip the balance of power fatally against the United States in the present deadly crisis of power and politics which we call the 'cold war.'"

With Cuba as a Soviet base, the United States suddenly finds itself engaged with threats from the four points of the compass—from Cuba on the south and along the Atlantic seaboard, from Russia against Berlin and Western Europe on the east, from Russia over the North Pole, from Russia and Red China to the west. Mr. Bemis warned in 1959 that "we simply cannot allow that to happen."

Now that it has happened and that the Soviets are involving the United States on a fourth front, the whole problem of Cuba is taking on a new dimension—one that admittedly is far more dangerous to the security of the United States than at any time in the past.

A POLICY THAT FAILED

Soviet power, now firmly planted in the Caribbean, marks the collapse of a U.S. policy followed since Cuban exiles were allowed to invade Castro's Cuba without air cover or support in 1961.

American policy, up to this month, had been "to allow Cuba to wither on the vine." U.S. officials talked until recent days of isolating Cuba.

The idea at the highest level of the Kennedy administration has been to base this country's Cuban policy on the premise that the dictator of Cuba, in the end, would fall as the result of an economic breakdown.

Soviet boss Nikita Khrushchev, by throwing in economic aid to bolster Cuba's economy and military aid to stiffen its defenses and give the Reds striking power, has countered that U.S. policy. Castro, in effect, is covered by a Soviet guarantee against failure.

If a military base for communism located within 90 miles of Florida is to be removed, as officials talking privately see it now, the removal will have to be accomplished by military means.

Here again, however, President Kennedy finds himself boxed in by Khrushchev, now that Soviet power has been taken to Cuba.

The box: Let the United States make a move against Castro in Cuba, and Khrushchev will heat up the Berlin crisis, move into Laos, strike at Iran or into the Middle East. Chinese Communism will move against Formosa or prod North Koreans to move into South Korea.

With Khrushchev of Russia and Mao of Red China working together during a Cuban showdown, the United States could find itself swinging in all directions.

Cuba under Soviet domination is described by military men as throwing the United States off balance.

SOVIET BUILDUP

Armed forces within Cuba are gaining substantial strength.

President Kennedy himself, on September 4, reported that the Russians without doubt have put ground-to-air missiles similar to

the early U.S. Nike-Ajax into Cuba. Mr. Kennedy also confirmed that there are now Soviet-made torpedo boats with ship-to-ship guided missiles in Cuba.

In addition, Castro has at least 60 operational Mig fighters, Soviet-made tanks and Russian 122-millimeter artillery plus other guns in quantity, modern antiaircraft guns, considerable numbers of Soviet jeeps and trucks, quantities of radar and other electronic equipment. Small arms, including the latest machineguns from Communist Czechoslovakia and ammunition for such arms, have been supplied in quantity.

Main factor in Soviet aid, as confirmed by the President's statement, is a minimum of 3,500 Russians, described by British newsmen in Cuba who saw them as "brawny young men . . . tanned . . . fit and constantly in training." An eyewitness report by one of the British observers set the number of these Russians at "from 5,000 to 8,000."

Senator KENNETH B. KEATING, Republican, of New York, said that there were 5,000 Russian troops—not technicians—already in Cuba.

Such doubly confirmed reports, differing only as to the number which admittedly is growing day by day as Soviet freighters and personnel carriers arrive in Cuba, appear to be in line with earlier reports of Khrushchev's personal pledge to Raúl Castro, brother of Fidel. It supposedly was made to Raúl on his visit to Russia some months ago.

The Cuban, Defense Minister in his brother's dictatorship, asked Khrushchev to take Cuba into protection of the Warsaw Pact grouping. Khrushchev is said to have replied: "I will do better than that. I will send Russians to Cuba."

There are no reliable reports as yet that nuclear warheads or long-range missiles capable of delivering them on U.S. cities have been placed in Cuba. Chances are, experts say, that Khrushchev would insist on keeping such weapons aboard Russia's nuclear submarines, which, however, could use Cuban bases.

Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, summoned the Ambassadors of the Latin American countries to the State Department on September 5 to give them information gathered by the United States on the flow of Soviet military personnel and materiel to Cuba.

President Kennedy, in his statement of September 4, declared that if there were aggression from Cuba against any other part of the Western Hemisphere, then the United States would act. Threat from Cuba, as the President interpreted it, should be dealt with "as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace."

Present policy of the United States, as it appears to the world, is to accept the buildup of Cuba as a Soviet base without using military force to prevent that buildup. Policy now is to avoid shooting.

With the Russians thus established on an island base within the Western Hemisphere, however, there are real chances of serious incidents. The U.S. base at Guantanamo is in more danger. Trouble for Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama, and other countries on the Latin American mainland is more likely than ever.

WHAT IT WILL TAKE

Congressional leaders, by September 7, were agreed it might take U.S. military action in Cuba to remove the threat to U.S. security. Republican leaders urged legislation giving Mr. Kennedy authority to make what military move he deemed necessary. It was then that the President asked authority to call 150,000 reservists.

If it comes to a fight to oust Castro's dictatorship, the conflict may be bloody. U.S. soldiers in Cuba would find themselves up against not just Cuban Reds, but Russians too.

War over Cuba, discounted by administration leaders until recent weeks, has been brought closer by Khrushchev's act of moving Soviet arms and military men into an island of the Americas.

[From the Northern Virginia Sun]

ALL TRAFFIC HARASSING EXPECTED; 1961 NOTE WARNED UNITED STATES ON CUBA

(By Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott)

The East Germans are expected to soon begin harassing the allies' Berlin air traffic with newly installed electronic counter equipment.

These electronic devices, similar to those being installed in Cuba, are showing up along the three air corridors linking West Berlin to West Germany.

U.S. Intelligence estimates warn that the ECE stations are being readied to blockade the corridors by jamming the guidance control systems of allied aircraft flying into the big Tempelhof Airfield in West Berlin.

By really intensive use of these and other methods, the East Germans, if backed by the Soviets, can effectively block the corridors according to U.S. military experts. Planes flying these airfares because of bad weather in the fall and winter months must depend about 80 percent of the time on radio guidance from ground control stations.

Already the Soviet puppet East German regime is preparing to justify this warlike takeover by listing the corridors as East German Republic airfares in documents circulated to all countries recognizing the Communist government.

Copies of these explosive documents, obtained by U.S. intelligence agents are being carefully examined for their full significance by State Department experts on East German-Soviet affairs.

One opinion of these experts is that Soviet Premier Khrushchev is planning to use the East Germans to touch off a brandnew war of nerves over West Berlin to determine if the United States will stand firm.

Also that Khrushchev will link the East German blockade of the corridors closely with the use of ECE measures against U.S. planes flying over and around Cuba.

THE SECRET NOTE

Although the communication was never made public, Khrushchev sent a blunt note to President Kennedy in April 1961 threatening West Berlin if the United States used troops against Cuba. This alarming note was delivered to the White House on the weekend before the ill-fated Cuban invasion.

A congressional source, who knows the whole story about the note, says that it scared McGeorge Bundy, the chief foreign policy adviser in the White House, into prevailing on the President to call off U.S. air strikes planned to help the Cuban rebels bomb out Castro's air force on the invasion eve.

This could explain why such a note was not made public—because it would make Americans begin to think what quid pro quo guides our foreign policy.

It might also shed new light on why Khrushchev is so boldly sending "an estimated" 20,000 military "technicians" and "advisers" to Cuba without fear of U.S. counter military action.

These new Soviet threats are one of the reasons behind Vice President Lyndon Johnson's trip to Turkey, Greece, and Italy. He is obtaining assurances from Western leaders of these NATO allies that they will support U.S. military action if necessary, to break any Communist air blockade.

Before leaving on this trip, Vice President Johnson told a small gathering at his home that both President Kennedy and he expected Khrushchev to move against West Berlin last year.

He said this estimate was the reason why President Kennedy called up Reserve units to buildup U.S. forces in Western Europe.

NEW CRISIS BREWING

The Joint Chiefs of Staff now believe that 1962 is the year that Khrushchev may try to force the West out of West Berlin. This military evaluation is supported by a Swedish intelligence report that Khrushchev is planning to create an incident and use it as an excuse to send Soviet troops into West Berlin.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator from New York will yield at this point, I would say he is correct in that respect. I have heard mention of Cuba, Berlin, southeast Asia, the Middle East, and whatnot, all together. So mention of them has been made, but never, to the best of my knowledge, with the connotation of a deal attached.

Mr. KEATING. The distinguished Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE]—who replied, one day last week, to an address which I had previously made about Cuba, and whose address has been challenged today by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DOB] on important, vital particulars—stated, as a part of his address, that when President Kennedy was asked about a statement made by the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], calling for a U.S. invasion of Cuba, to stop the flow of Soviet men and supplies, the President said:

The United States has obligations all around the world, including West Berlin and other areas, which are very sensitive, and, therefore, I think that in considering what appropriate action we should take, we have to consider the totality of our obligations and also the responsibilities which we bear in so many different parts of the world—

Adding:

In response to your specific question, we do not have information that troops have come into Cuba.

That was on August 30.

In the text of the statement which the President made on Cuba, this statement was made:

The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of the larger issue as well as the context of the special relationships which have characterized the inter-American system.

The fact that the majority leader, who so ably and so loyally represents the administration on this floor, has made the statement which he has—namely, that there is no relationship between the two—is exactly what was asked for by me in the same television address, as the first and foremost point:

First and foremost, we must make clear to the people of Cuba and the people of Berlin and equally clear to all the peoples of Latin America and the peoples of Germany and Europe that no such deal is the cards.

The objective of these remarks and others which the Senator from New York has made has been to stiffen our position with regard to Cuba and to say to the President and the administration that there is backing in the Congress for a

more vigorous position, a harder position, with regard to the Cuban situation, and, indeed, as regards Berlin.

Both Houses of the Congress, in my judgment, will respond to keeping Cuba and Berlin entirely separate and distinct, and in not making a concession on one in order to get a concession on the other, and in standing absolutely firm on Berlin, and at the same time in taking more vigorous steps than any which have been taken to date to prevent further shipping of military equipment and military personnel into Cuba.

The Senator from New York is well aware of the problems which the President faces, and it is not his desire to add to those problems.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEATING. In just a moment.

The responsibility of the President is to make the final decisions; and it is an awesome responsibility in the face of world events as they exist today.

I thank my friend and colleague from Montana for his reference to the fact that I have tried to be responsible.

I have been critical, but I have tried to be responsible in such criticism. I shall continue to be, but I shall not hesitate to speak out at any time when I feel that additional facts should be brought out.

I again express my gratitude to the Senator from Montana for the manner in which he has raised this question, and the reassurance—which is the important thing—which I consider implicit in his remark to the effect that no deal or arrangement has been made, or, indeed, will be made, to trade off anything to do with Berlin against anything to do with Cuba.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly at that point?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am indebted to the Senator from New York for his clarification of the news story. There is no deal affecting the interrelationship of these two areas, Cuba and Berlin. I express the hope that, if anyone ever suggested such a possibility, he would immediately contact the President of the United States, who is, of course, in charge of our foreign policy, and who, I think, would be most happy to set the record straight on any occasion when such a situation was placed before him.

Mr. KEATING. When I received a call from the Secretary of State this morning, that is exactly what I said to him—that a statement by the President or the Secretary of State to the effect that these are not part and parcel of one transaction, to be traded off against each other, would be the very best way to set the record straight. I still think it would be. But the fact that the distinguished majority leader has made this statement on the floor gives me great confidence that that is the situation.

Let me further say that I recollect when I approached the State Department in mid-August asking for a report on the Soviet landings, I received, after 2 weeks, a reply that was so uninformative as to be virtually useless.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I am pleased that the Senator from New York has had this colloquy with the majority leader growing out of the telecast program that he has already explained to the Senate; but I would like to make these comments, if he would permit me to do so, apropos his observations.

I assure the Senator from New York that President Kennedy does not barter freedom. Freedom is not for barter, and it would be unthinkable that President Kennedy for a moment would relate Berlin and Cuba for negotiating purposes in any negotiations with Russia.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs, I want to say that the President of the United States has no intention whatsoever of linking the two in any negotiation, because the two could not be linked without just such ugly rumors as the Senator said he heard arising in Washington—namely, that the President of the United States is bartering freedom.

I would have us all remember that in the very critical situation involving Cuba there must be complete unity among us in supporting the right arm of the President of the United States. In the very delicate and difficult crises that exist around the world, it is very easy, I think, in the field of semantics, to link Cuba and Berlin; but they are unlinkable in that each crisis involves its own set of facts.

I say to the Senator from New York and the American people that they can rest assured that the President of the United States does not trade off freedom in any negotiation in any field of foreign policy.

My subcommittee is maintaining very close contact with this administration. For example, Monday afternoon at 4:30, we are to have a conference with the United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Ambassador Morrison. Tomorrow, we will meet with other State Department officials on the same subject. As chairman of the subcommittee, I have taken the position from the very beginning of this crisis that we must be kept informed with regard to what is going on. I think we are. The Senator from New York and the American people can rest assured that these crises are being considered in their separable, individual natures, and they are not being considered in any negotiating package. Let me assure the Senator from New York of that fact.

The Senator will share my point of view that the time has come when we must ascertain the position of our associates in the Western Hemisphere, members of the Organization of American States, as to what the course of action should be, if there is to be joint action, in regard to the threat of the establishment of a Russian-Communist beachhead in Cuba. I think there is grave danger that such a beachhead might very well be established.

One of the most delicate problems we have—it is very risky even to comment on it publicly, but it should be commented on—is the problem involving the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine

is not dead, but I do not think the Monroe Doctrine is the doctrine it was when it was first established by the United States, or when we enforced it 50 or 75 years ago. In part—and note my language—it was established in order to guarantee to our neighbors to the south of us that we would protect them, as well as ourselves, from any possible overrunning of them, or any one of them, by a foreign power.

We carried that out, although, as we know, the historians have written that in the early decades we carried it out through the British fleet. After all, our great ally, Great Britain, enforced the Monroe Doctrine for a good many years, in that other foreign nations knew if they sought to exercise any extraterritorial ambitions over Latin America we would stand firm on the Monroe Doctrine but the Monroe Doctrine would, in those days, be enforced by the British fleet.

A great many changes have occurred since the initiation of the Monroe Doctrine. For example, the section which declares that we will not become involved in European affairs is a completely dead letter. Insofar as it relates to this hemisphere, it is a two-pronged doctrine; and let us never forget it. It is a doctrine in which we made clear that from the standpoint of our own national security we did not propose to have foreign powers establish extraterritorial rights in the Western Hemisphere. But we also said we were opposed to that because we were going to protect our neighbors to the south who, in that time of history, were exceedingly weak nations and could have been easily overrun if they could not rely upon their great neighbor to the north to come to their defense and assistance if necessary.

In our conferences in Latin America for some time past we have found that the attitude of our Latin American friends today in some instances is not the attitude they adopted at the time the Monroe Doctrine was first initiated. This is a delicate subject, but some of them have taken the position—and it is well recognized—that any carrying out of any policy of the Monroe Doctrine as originally contemplated by the United States, so far as Latin American countries are concerned, would have to be done with their complete consent, cooperation, and association. In other words, the Latin Americans question the right of the United States to take the position that it can say to any foreign power, "Your relationships with country X, Y, or Z in Latin America are going to be determined by the United States."

So we enter into areas of conflict, which require the exercise of very delicate diplomacy.

During World War II, we negotiated a series of treaties and declarations by Western Hemisphere nations which sought to make incursions by Axis Powers into the hemisphere the subject of combined opposition and resistance by the signatories.

We sought, in other words, to enforce the Monroe Doctrine not unilaterally, but through hemispheric action.

That is how we changed the concept of the Monroe Doctrine during World

War II relative to the German-Italian-Japanese axis.

Since then, we have done much the same thing relative to communism. We have held a series of conferences in an effort to keep communism out of this hemisphere not simply as U.S. policy and by U.S. action but as a policy and action of the OAS.

I do not know of any country which signed the act of Punta del Este which would not want to cooperate with us in stemming the establishment of communism in Latin America by way either of a beachhead in Cuba or of a Communist taking over of X, Y, or Z country in Latin America, for there is a recognition that if that should happen in Latin America to one country, or to two or three, it could very well extend through the hemisphere.

There have been in the press some rather excited editorials whose writers have not taken into account that the Monroe Doctrine today is not the Monroe Doctrine established by President Monroe, because of these changes in the attitude of some of our Latin American friends in regard to the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to certain types of facts now. I only mention it in passing in this discussion, because it ought to be noted in the Record.

So the senior Senator from Oregon believes our subcommittee ought to know what is going on within the Organization of American States and within the council of the Organization of American States. To that end I asked Ambassador Morrison this morning if he would make himself available to give us a very informal executive briefing in regard to the Organization of American States, as we have a right to ask. He has the privilege of giving it or of not giving it. I am sure he will give it.

We have asked officials of the State Department—either the Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs—to give us a briefing tomorrow in regard to this whole issue vis-a-vis Cuba and other Latin American states.

I appreciate the generosity of the Senator from New York in letting me make these comments at this length. I am about through. I felt that in the midst of this colloquy with the majority leader I owed it to my administration to make the statements I made.

I close by saying that I want the American people to know that they have every reason to place complete faith in the President of the United States, irrespective of their partisanship relative to this Cuban crisis, for the President of the United States has not placed Cuba and Berlin on the barter market.

The President is seeking to defend freedom both in Cuba and in Berlin on the basis of the facts involved in each crisis, and they are different in some respects. The common objective is not different; it is our policy in both places that freemen are not to be overridden by communism without American support of freemen. We intend to support freedom where freemen are willing to stand up and fight for freedom.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, it is very heartening to have this additional

assurance from the distinguished Senator from Oregon, who acts as the chairman of the important subcommittee dealing with Latin American affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and to hear from his lips the assertion that no effort will be made to relate Berlin to Cuba in connection with any negotiations.

I hope that when the President is asked again about the situation he will make that very clear. If he is going to say that the United States has obligations all around the world, including West Berlin and other areas, and if he is going to say that the Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace, then the very delineation which has been made by the Senator from Oregon might be added, in order that it might be made perfectly clear to the American people—because I am sure that is what they want—that there is no negotiation as between these two situations, and there will be no concessions made on the one issue in order to get concessions on the other.

I also wish to make it clear, knowing the President of the United States, having served with him, that there is not one doubt in my mind for a moment as to his intentions, his patriotism, or his desire to do the right thing under the circumstances. If these colloquies serve no other purpose, I hope they will serve the purpose of making it clear to the President's advisers that the Congress is behind the President in any decision which he may make which is a firm one, a solid one, one in which interests are not paired off one against the other.

I commend the Senator from Oregon for his action in trying to get from the members of the Organization of American States some information as to what their attitude will be. That is very important. We should make every effort to proceed in concert with our friends of the Latin American Republics. When I made four suggestions the other day, the second suggestion was that we try to do that very thing. The Senator from Oregon is on the right track on that point.

I must add one word about the Monroe Doctrine. It is now undergoing a reinterpretation. Before the Senator from Oregon came to the Chamber, the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] was speaking on that subject. I think perhaps the Senator from Oregon did not hear him. The Senator from Connecticut said that if we say that the Monroe Doctrine does not apply, perhaps in all candor we should say that it no longer exists. In a colloquy with reference to the Monroe Doctrine I said that I think it applies in Cuba. I do not think it is an answer to say that the Cuban Government invited in the Soviets, and therefore the Monroe Doctrine does not apply in a case in which a country invites in a foreign power. If we are going to accept the Monroe Doctrine as President Monroe enunciated it, I point out that he expressly covered such a situation as that. He said that some foreign power might try to impose upon one of our southern brethren—meaning one of the Latin American Republics—a form of government they did not want.

That is exactly what has happened in Cuba. If we say that Cuba is out, and we now have a Monroe Doctrine minus one, then if there is a coup d'état in some other country and that country calls in Soviet Russia, the Communist Chinese, or some other power, then we will have a Monroe Doctrine minus two. Are we going to keep the Monroe Doctrine alive? Certainly the American people look upon it as a very important part of our policy. If we are going to scrap it, ignore it, or completely reinterpret it, I think we must make clear what we are doing. I do not think we can interpret it in such a way as to keep it viable, and say that it does not apply if a country invites in a foreign European power or an outside power no matter what the government is that is established there, whether it is the will of the people or not.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I am glad the Senator from New York has raised those points, because I would be completely misunderstood, or I would have completely failed to present my view if I read in the Record any statement that would be subject to the possible interpretation that the Senator from New York may be making of what I have previously said here this afternoon.

Certainly Cuba cannot determine whether or not there is a Monroe Doctrine. Certainly country X, that may invite in Russia, cannot determine whether there is a Monroe Doctrine. I am talking about free nations in Latin America. I only wish to point out that we have to be very careful that we do not make an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine applicable to them on a unilateral basis, for they are very sensitive now about the Monroe Doctrine, as to whether or not we are going to speak for countries X, Y, and Z, which are free countries, and not Communist countries. That is why I have urged that if there is an application of the Monroe Doctrine, we ought to do it in concert through the OAS with our free neighbors to the south of us.

I should like to make the point as clear as I know how to use the English language, that, Monroe Doctrine or no Monroe Doctrine, we have a duty to protect our own security. If the establishment of a Russian beachhead in Latin America for offensive purposes threatens the security of the United States, then no matter how many nations in Latin America or who in Latin America feels that we should not protect our own security, they must be ignored. But that has nothing to do with the Monroe Doctrine, I respectfully point out. That has to do with the responsibility of our Government to keep America secure from the danger of a Communist beachhead so close to our shores that our own security may become endangered.

I made that comment in effect the other day on the floor of the Senate when I was discussing that problem much more briefly with the colleague of the Senator from New York [Mr. Javrs]. I say nothing here today that I did not intend to make clear the other day, except I did not go into that detail.

If the Senator would permit me, I should like to ask unanimous consent to have printed in the *RECORD*, after the Senator's comments, that part of a lecture that I gave at the University of Arizona at Tucson some months ago, in which I discussed some of the problems involving the Monroe Doctrine.

Taking what I have said here this afternoon plus the lecture which I gave at the University of Arizona at Tucson, there could not be any possibility of anyone misunderstanding the position of the senior Senator from Oregon on this very delicate subject, unless one merely wishes to misunderstand it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the *RECORD* following the speech of the Senator from New York my lecture at the University of Arizona at Tucson some months ago dealing with the Monroe Doctrine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. (See exhibit I.)

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his contribution. I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT I

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN LATIN AMERICA
(Remarks of Senator WAYNE MORSE at the 1962 International Forum, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz., Feb. 22, 1962)

In a dispatch to the American Ambassador in London dated July 25, 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney set forth a classic of extreme interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. "Today," he said, "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

The basic fact of our relations today with Latin America is that we are abandoning the "Olney doctrine," and returning to a much more literal and genuine interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, at least to that part of it which related to the Western Hemisphere.

What, after all, did the Monroe Doctrine really say? Certainly it scarcely resembled what the Secretary of State enunciated as our hemispheric policy in 1895. It actually had two parts, one covering our relations toward Europe, and the second covering our relations with other nations in the Western Hemisphere. Too many Americans have rather conveniently forgotten that one part of the Monroe Doctrine declared, and I quote: "Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none."

And again: "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere."

This resolve on our part to refrain from participating in the affairs of Europe is a dead letter. But what of that section of the Monroe Doctrine relating to the Western Hemisphere? It declared, and I quote: "That the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." And again: "But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on

great consideration and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

The 1962 Declaration of Punta del Este was a much better restatement of the Monroe Doctrine than the Olney dispatch of 1895.

The United States is no longer "practically sovereign" in the Western Hemisphere.

Our relations with Latin America have been radically altered by two revolutionary changes since the end of World War II. The first of these has been the emergence of the United States from the confines of the Monroe Doctrine, from isolation, and the broadening of our foreign policy horizon from regionalism to globalism. The global commitments incurred by, or thrust upon, the United States in the late forties constituted a revolution in American foreign policy—a revolution, in the words of Prof. Hans Morgenthau, that marked "the permanent assumption by the United States of responsibilities beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere."

The second great change has been the emergence of Latin America into the mainstream of world history, or, more precisely, the awakening of the long-quiescent peoples of Latin America to the great social forces—communism, democracy, and, above all, nationalism—that in our time have aroused all the people of the non-European world. Thus it may be said that while the United States has emerged from isolation to join and lead a worldwide community of wealthy and long-established democratic states, the nations of Latin America have emerged from isolation to join the new countries of Asia and Africa not in a community but in a common revolution. It is a revolution conceived in economic deprivation and political humiliation, nurtured by the force of nationalism and soaring hopes of economic advance, and dedicated to the goal of securing for themselves decent, dignified, and rewarding lives as modern nations.

Both the United States and the Latin American Republics came into their new roles with unresolved dilemmas and anomalies. The ambiguity for the United States was its failure until very recently to adjust the regionalism of the Monroe Doctrine to the new globalism of the problems that confront us.

While we spent billions to rebuild Europe, and more billions to help the new nations of Asia and Africa, we said to Latin America: "We are not going to help you, and under the Monroe Doctrine, we are not going to let anyone else help you, either."

Latin America came into the modern world afflicted with an even greater dilemma—the deep contradiction between the language of democracy and progress, and the reality of oligarchy and reaction that have conditioned the political life of Latin America since the days of Simon Bolivar.

"Democracy," said Benito Juarez a century ago, "is the destiny of future humanity." But the history of Latin America has, with rare exceptions, belied that destiny and an angry and aroused generation of Latin Americans now demands an end to the ancient hypocrisy and immediate efforts on the part of their governments to achieve performances that match their promises.

The Mexican writer and diplomat Octavio Paz (currently in the Office of External Affairs, Mexico City), expressed the basic contradiction incisively in an essay on the character of his country. "The liberal and democratic ideology," he wrote, "far from expressing our concrete historical situation, obscured it. The political lie installed itself almost constitutionally among our coun-

tries. The moral damage has been incalculable and reaches into deep layers of our character. Lies are something we move in with ease. During more than a hundred years we have suffered regimes of brute force, which were at the service of feudal oligarchies, but utilized the language of liberty."

Such considerations as these—too briefly defined—condition the relations between the United States and Latin America in the 1960's. The problem for both the United States and Latin America is to devise a hemisphere policy in a global context. I should like now to examine some of the elements that might comprise such a policy.

The basic policy of the United States toward Latin America today is to foster both security and progress in the shortest possible time. The Alliance for Progress has belatedly been recognized as a vital modern implementation of the Monroe Doctrine, along with the establishment of the Organization of American States, and the declarations that first nazism and later communism have no rightful place in the inter-American system.

The success of the Alliance for Progress, given the explosive social forces at work in Latin America today and our woefully belated willingness to come to grips with them, is problematical. Its conception and intent, however, are wisely attuned to the realities of the 1960's, to the need for a hemisphere policy in a global context.

The Alliance for Progress represents for the United States a new form of "intervention," an intervention in depth to cope with deeply rooted social and economic ills of Latin America. Before commenting on some of its problems and prospects, I should like to reexamine briefly the traditional concepts of intervention and nonintervention in relation to the new forces at work in Latin America.

Today's problem of nonintervention, simply stated, is whether the Organization of American States can or cannot intervene in the affairs of one of its member states in order to forestall intervention from beyond the American continents that threatens the security of the entire hemisphere.

The question is a simple one but any answer to it is enormously complicated by the fact that to the Latin Americans "intervention" is not an abstract concept but an historical experience deriving principally from their relations with the United States. It is not difficult to understand that, for deeply rooted historical reasons, the Latin American reaction to Soviet intervention in the hemisphere is conditioned by the experience of American intervention.

The attitude of the Latin Americans toward intervention by the United States is by no means one of unambiguous hostility, as is widely believed. It is rather an ambivalent attitude, depending upon the cause for which intervention is undertaken. In recent years there has been a steady procession of Latins coming to Washington to petition for U.S. assistance for overthrowing Batista or Castro in Cuba, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, or some other Latin American ruler. To these exiles—of whom the most conspicuous at present are the large number of refugees from Communist Cuba—the doctrine of nonintervention in itself has no appeal. It is their contention that when we withhold assistance we are in effect intervening on the side of entrenched regimes. The United States is thus doubly damned, regardless of its acts or omissions, and I think that those well-meaning persons who suffer excessively from flagellations of conscience over our deviations from nonintervention would do well to face up to the fact that the United States cannot avoid playing a major, and often decisive, role in the affairs of the Latin American Republics.

"The moral here," as one perceptive student of Latin American affairs recently put